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Abstract
Warning systems are an essential component of risk management for natural threats.
They trigger active and/or passive countermeasures. This paper introduces the need
for and use of warning systems through the review of recent major natural disasters
(the Sumatra Tsunami, the 2005 Alpine Flood, the 2005 Hurricanes, Katrina and Rita)
but also the potential flu pandemic. Positive and negative lessons are drawn from
these cases. This is followed by a review of two specific warning systems which
together with the preceding cases leads to a list of requirements for warning systems.
These reviews also show that it is desirable to have tools with which different
warning systems and their role in risk management can be evaluated. A procedure
based on decision making under uncertainty allows one to do so. The basis of this
procedure and its application to warning systems, including some sensitivity analyses
to demonstrate practical consequences are then shown. Decision trees and Bayesian
trees are used in this context.
The paper leads to the conclusions that the basic elements of warning systems
are associated with problems, which eventually may be solved. The formal risk
assessment allows one to prioritize the problems and the solutions.
Introduction
Warning systems intend to provide information, which allows people to avoid threats
or at least to reduce the consequences affecting them and causing material losses.
Consequences affecting people range from fatalities to physical and psychological
injuries. Material losses cover a wide range from personal property to life supporting
facilities ranging from agriculture to physical infrastructure. Some effects involve
both personal and material aspects such as losses of socio-political infrastructure and
largely aesthetic damage. By putting warning systems in the context of potential
damage, one can assess their value and possibly prioritize them. This is the approach
taken in this paper. This will not only allow one to evaluate the effectiveness of
warning devices and processes but also to get an idea on the consequences if they do
not function, including the effect of false alarms. While all this applies to any threat,
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the paper - in keeping within the topics of the conference - will concentrate on natural
ones.
The paper will start with putting natural threats and warning systems into
context through a brief review of several natural events, the December, 2004,
Tsunami, the flooding in the Swiss Alps in summer 2005, hurricanes Katrina and Rita
in summer and fall 2005, and the potential threat of the Avian flu, all of which
provide ample evidence of natural threats and the performance of warning systems.
Following these introductory examples, which will provide a glimpse of when
warning systems were successful and when they failed, two established warning
systems will be reviewed leading to a set of criteria that warning systems should
fulfill. From this it becomes evident that a fundamental, formal approach, which
allows one to assess risk management in general and warning systems, specifically, is
desirable. This paper then makes an attempt in this direction by using the process of
decision-making under uncertainty as a basis. The formal decision making process
will be introduced, and the formal risk management and updating through information
(warning systems) will be discussed in detail. It will be shown with a few sensitivity
analyses how one can practically evaluate the effect of different factors influencing
risk management systems. All this will lead to the conclusions in which problematic
aspects of warning systems will be summarized and suggestions made on how to
proceed.
Warning Systems in the Context of Recent Events
The December 26, 2004 Tsunami
As is well known and as e.g. Liu (2005) reports an earthquake associated with the
release of tectonic strains at the subduction of the Indian Plate under the Burma Plate,
specifically SW of Banda Aceh at 3.30°N, 95.78°E, occurred shortly before 8 a.m.
local time on December 26, 2004, and caused a Tsunami. The rupture is estimated to
have propagated at 2 km/sec although more recent accounts talk about slower
velocities. More details and specific information will be provided in the keynote
paper by Synolakis at this conference. What is of interest here is the timeline of
events shown below:
0.59 GMT (7.59 local time) Earthquake
1:30 Tsunami impacts Sumatra
2:30 Tsunami impacts Southern Thailand
3:00 Tsunami impacts Sri Lanka
Tsunami impacts coast of Southern India
4:30 Tsunami impacts Maldives
7:00 Tsunami impacts (minor) Africa
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The Earthquake was recorded worldwide including Australia and India. Evidently
(WSWS, 2005) the Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii was alerted at 8:08 and
warned the other stations around the Pacific but at 8:14 notified these stations that no
immediate Tsunami danger existed for the Pacific. No specific Tsunami warning
system including sensors and immediately applicable models supported by an
adequate communication system existed in the Indian Ocean area. The Swedish
Newspaper, “Expressen” (12.28.04) claims that the "meteorology experts in
Thailand" were meeting at 8 a.m. local time and decided not to issue a warning as “a
courtesy to the tourist industry". Clearly these sources due to their political flavor
(WSWS) or because of the traumatic loss of many countrymen (Expressen) are
probably biased. Nevertheless, there definitely was a lack of possible warning, as
Synolakis et al., (2005) remark, in that no communication took place after the
Adaman and the Nicobar Islands were hit in spite of intact communication systems;
such communication could have saved many lives in Southern India and Sri Lanka
where the Tsunami hit 2 hours later. The same reference (Synolakis et al., 2005) on
the other hand reports on some successful warning by the local government in the
Maldives and individual short wave communication warning ship owners to move out
of harbors.
The second aspect of the warning process, namely, the reaction of people once
they receive the warning or when directly confronted with the threat and with
sufficient time to do something also showed some interesting differences. Synolakis
et al. (2005) report on proper reaction by “moving vertically” either based on preexisting plans, knowledgeable hotel personnel or fellow tourists (from Japan e.g.)
who knew how to react properly while others ran after the initial retreating waves and
were killed! Another aspect, which Synolakis emphasized during a talk at MIT
(2005) with dramatic examples from Sri Lanka, is the effect of floating debris on
injuries and fatalities. This aspect is related to a more fundamental one, namely the
type of structures subjected to potential tsunami waves and the effect of artificial and
natural protective features (Darlymple et al., 2005; Synolakis et al., 2005).
Only somewhat related to the Indian Ocean Tsunami but definitely to
Tsunamis in general is the possibility of false alarms. According to Gonzales (2005)
the March 28, 2005 earthquake caused panic in Sri Lanka with 10 deaths, since
people were afraid of another big Tsunami. On the other hand, properly designed
warning systems can prevent false alarms as happened following the November 2003
Aleutian earthquake when a Tsunami evacuation in Hawaii was called off in time
saving approximately 60 million $ (Lautenbacher, 2005).
Tentative Lessons
The time interval between the earthquake and even between first indication of a
Tsunami and Tsunami impact in e.g. Sri Lanka and Thailand would have been
sufficient to warn people. Large scale Tsunami models did exist to make adequate
predictions after the fact and if applied in time would have been very useful in
warning. On the other hand, the lack of Tsunami oriented warning hardware ranging
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from specific sensors to an established specific communication systems in the Indian
Ocean area was a severe impediment.
Local topography caused significant differences in the run-up and impact on
land. Detailed run-up models did not exist. Even if warned, the appropriate reaction
depended on instinctual reaction or specific education of the affected people and on
communication. The latter has different components that did/did no work.
(Communication from national center to affected communities, local communication
and detailed on-the-spot instructions.)
Quite obviously warning systems have to be part of a complete risk
management approach which consists of other measures such as properly designed
structures and evacuation routes.
Warning systems have to be able to cover both sides - positive warning with
adequate time to react properly and allowing one to call off countermeasures in a
timely fashion.
The August 19-21, 2005 Flood in Switzerland
In late August 2005, the so-called Genoa Low (Figure 1) developed. This weather
pattern causes intense rainfalls on the Northern flank of the Alps and usually moves
eastward. This was also the case in August 2005 with flooding starting in
Switzerland then moving East to Austria and eventually to Rumania. The Genoa Low
has historically caused major floods in Switzerland e.g. the Magdalena flood in 1342,
the Emmental flood in 1837 and the 1868 Alpine flood (Luterbacher, 2005) but the
August 2005 flood seems to have been associated with record rainfalls at least in
regard to periods during which precise measurements were made (Figure 2). Figure 3
indicates where major flooding occurred during the August 2005 event. The areas of
primary flooding consisted of areas where strong rainfall and flood events are
relatively well known (Reuss-Valley, Napf) but also others (lower Engadine) where
such events are rare. The map in Figure 3 indicates that the local distribution of
flooding varies widely. Clearly the scale compared to the other discussed events,
(Sumatra Tsunami, Katrina, Rita) is much smaller but local differences apply also
these are much larger events. This local variability is the reason for describing the
Switzerland flood in detail since it has a major impact on warning processes and
systems. Also, the total direct material damage was rather high, estimated at 2.5
billion sfr (2.2 billion $) while the death toll was relatively low (6) (BWG, 2005).
Finally, the first author of this paper was traveling into one of the affected areas just
at that time and has thus had first hand experience at the time of the flood.
The main damage directly resulting from the rainfall was primary flooding
with significant secondary damage caused by river erosion, scouring of infrastructure,
deviation of rivers and depositing of river deposits outside river beds; several rainfall
induced landslides also occurred. The main problems were associated with the
interruption of the main N-S axis effectively leaving only the Western N-S axis open
(Figure 4) and this during the main travel season. Secondary flooding further
downstream involved, in addition to the usual and well known flooding of streets and
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basements, additional characteristics in that large amounts of trees/branches were
transported and became stuck under bridges and in rivers.
Regarding impact on human life, there were six deaths and about 2000 people
were temporarily evacuated. From this one can conclude that a combination of
adequate warning time and functioning warning systems minimized impact on human
life even in relatively rapidly changing situations. (Alpine streams can literally flood
in a few minutes.) Much of this can be associated with local experience and the fact
that the primary emergency responsibility is local (civil protection). Higher level, i.e.
cantonal and national support is subsidiary and is mobilized only if the local/regional
authorities request it. The cantonal and national organizations are, however, on alert
such that subsidiary action can be mobilized with little delay. In August 2005, this
was mostly in form of airforce support with helicopters for evacuation and supply of
isolated villages, and the army providing additional heavy excavating equipment and
relief of personnel.
The warning systems and relevant infrastructure risk management involved a
number of other measures such as the control of weirs which exist at a number of
outflows of lakes and the mobilization of emergency repair equipment along old
embankments (Figure 5).
On the other hand, the warning/advice to rail and road users was (based on
personal experience) not as good as it could have been. The accuracy of travel
advisories was questionable in that certain roads were mentioned as blocked, while
they were actually open and vice versa. Similar inaccuracies occurred also in TV, radio - and newspaper reports.
Tentative Lessons
The large scale meteorological forecast was reasonably accurate although the extreme
rainfall was not predicted. A gap exists with regard to small scale forecasts. This
problem is recognized and it is subject to a research project on small scale flooding
by WSL (Hegg and Vogt, 2005). It will be interesting to see down to what level of
regional resolution and accuracy of forecasting such a system will work.
The local civil protection capabilities were adequate regarding safeguarding
human life. The local infrastructure maintenance capabilities also were in most cases
adequate to react to the consequences (debris removal, etc.) and where this was not
the case the subsidiary aspect of upper level support appeared to work.
The national traffic/transportation guidance was not quite what it could have
been. This is probably associated with a lack of communication from the local to the
national level. (The lower level was justifiably preoccupied with dealing with the
local emergency.) Nevertheless, this gap has a wider economic impact (major
disruption of transportation routes e.g.).
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Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Hurricane Katrina, August 29 2005
Hurricane Katrina approached the Gulf of Mexico in late August 2005 after an initial
landfall in Florida as a Category 1/2 hurricane it crossed the Gulf, increased to
Category 5 and then made landfall on August 29 as a Category 3 hurricane (Figure 6).
The projected path initially put it right over New Orleans but then it moved further
East and landfall occurred on the Mississippi coast line (Figure 6). This coastline
was, therefore, subject to the classic hurricane damage of high water, waves, wind
and drenching rain. New Orleans was not subject to a direct hit but to high surges
from Lake Ponchartrain. Nevertheless, observations showed that the lakeshore levees
were not overtopped. Damage occurred through the breaking of canal levees/walls
along the London Avenue Canal, the 17th Street Canal and the Inner Harbor
Navigation Canal (IHNC) and the overtopping of the Michaud levee (for all these
locations, see Map, Figure 7). (Mlakar, 2006). Many of the canals in New Orleans
and thus also the London Avenue and 17th Street Canals are drainage canals which
allow the six pumping stations (total capacity (50,000 cft/sec) to move water into
Lake Ponchartrain. Clearly a massive break as it occurred in August 2005
overwhelmed the system (Hayes, 2005).
The breaking of the levees caused the major flooding as shown in Figure 8
and leading to the many upsetting pictures shown in the media worldwide. The death
toll as of September 21, 2001 (CNI) was 1,033 (799 in Louisiana, 219 in Mississippi,
13 in Florida, 2 in Georgia and Alabama . Damage as of today is estimated at
between 80 and 100 billion US$ but will most likely be higher. The cause for the
levee breeches is under investigation by a number of professional committees and not
subject to this discussion, which will concentrate on issues related to the warning
system regarding New Orleans.
Hurricane warnings are well established along the Atlantic/Gulf coastline but
are hampered somewhat by the difficulty to predict exact landfall locations.
Nevertheless, an evacuation order for New Orleans was given on Sunday August 28.
A detailed evacuation plan, Figure 9, existed which had been developed and revised
based on the experience with Hurricanes George in 1998 and Ivan in 2000 and,
particularly, based on intensive traffic flow modelling by LADOT (Louisiana
Department of Transportation). The evacuation proved largely to be a success as
emphasized by the traffic flow (Figure 10), corresponding to 480,000 vehicles in 48
hours. It is estimated that about 80-90% of the population was evacuated. Also,
based on this information, many people evidently left before the actual evacuation
order was given. What did not work was that there were still 100,000 – 300,000
people left in the city of which roughly 100,000 could not evacuate because they did
not have access to personal vehicles. Plans existed based on “neighbor helping
neighbor” and the use of public transportation buses which had to (and did to some
extent) move people to the evacuation center at the Convention Center with the well
known consequence there: No further evacuation transportation from there, limited
food, inadequate sanitation and security. It should be noted that one of the reasons
for the slow evacuation of the city’s poor people was also their reluctance to abandon
6

their property which, as the reports in the newspapers (again anecdotal) showed, was
to some extent justified.
Hospitals and nursing homes are required by law to have evacuation plans
which include the pre-arrangement of transport and the routes to take. However, it
appears that some of the same busses were promised to several entities. The
additional problematic aspect was the flooding which for a number of entities
prevented evacuation by land vehicles. From newspaper reports it appears that
subsidiary transportation provided by the national guard (State responsibility) or the
armed forces (Federal government) did not work as quickly as necessary.
A major factor in the initial disorganization was the apparent lack of clear
assignments of responsibility to the local, State and Federal authorities. Lacking
communication and political infighting further complicated matters.
Another aspect again relating to risk management in a wider sense was the
effect of floods on pollution. Loose gas tanks are a standard occurrence in any flood.
In addition, the New Orleans – Lower Mississippi River area is essentially a strip of
chemical plants and the location of a number of historically polluted sites. As Reible
et al., (2006) discuss, this had major consequences on contamination of floodwater
and secondary consequences through contamination of the underlying soil.
Tentative Lessons
Large scale hurricane modeling together with a well developed evacuation plan are,
in principle, the basis for a well working warning system. What did not work was the
part of the evacuation process relying on neighbor help possibly hampered by social
resistance against evacuation.
Equally important is the fact that the consequences of the primary event
(hurricane/storm surge) caused a secondary event (levee breaks with flooding) for
which no warning system and also no adequate risk management plan existed.
Other lessons are the need to combine evacuation with protection of property
and multi-level evacuation plans for emergency entities (hospitals and similar).
Communication and clearly established responsibilities also appeared to lack.
Risk management and thus warning systems also have to deal with
pollution/contamination as a consequence of natural threats.
Hurricane Rita, September 24 2005
Hurricane Rita, a Level 3 hurricane occurred roughly a month after Katrina. Again,
this hurricane evolved from a Level 1 to a Level 5 to eventually hit land at Level 3.
Also, predictions put its landfall originally into the Galveston/Houston area (Figure
11a) but it eventually hit land further East (Figure 11b) near the Texas/Louisiana
border. Information on death toll and material damage are more difficult to obtain
than for Katrina. It appears that about 100 people were killed and the material
damage was 10 billion US$.
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The damage was again the classical hurricane damage along the coastline.
The reason for discussing this case is the reaction to an event which was reasonably
well predicted and for which the consequences were very much in everybody’s mind,
having been exposed to Katrina and its consequences. The Houston-Galveston area
has a well developed evacuation plan with different evacuation zones depending on
the hurricane level (Figure 12). Evacuation of Zone A began September 21 at 6 p.m.,
of Zone B on September 22 at 2 am and Zone C at 6 a.m. These are low lying zones.
What was not expected was that also people from other areas tried to evacuate which
led to the well known traffic jams as that shown for September 23 (Figure 13). It is
estimated that 2 million people evacuated (Harris County has 3.6 million inhabitants,
Galveston County has 267,000).
This all occurred during a very hot period with temperatures up to 100°F
(37°C). Newspaper statements (e.g. NZZ Sept. 24/25, 2005, Boston Globe, Feb. 21,
2006) claim that more people died during the evacuation than due to the hurricane
itself.
On the positive side are the evidently complete and successful evacuation of
the city of Lake Charles as well as of 605 oil drilling platforms in the Gulf. Also
refineries and other industrial plants were successfully shut down (as was actually
also the case in Katrina). Also, on the positive side was the reaction in New Orleans
where some hospitals were evacuated by airlift and transportation/food supply in
large quantities was available at the evacuation center.
Tentative Lesson:
As mentioned above, the reason for discussing Hurricane Rita are the controllable and
non-controllable aspects of warning systems. While smaller cities and industrial sites
were successfully evacuated, there was an unnecessary mass exodus from the
Houston area. Warning systems, therefore, have to address both sides of human
nature, the “nothing will happen to me” as well as the “panic”.
Power Outages in Spring/Summer 2003 and 2005
On August 14, 2003, 62000 MW power production in the eastern US and Canada
collapsed. On June 22, 2005, the entire power supply of the Swiss Federal Railroads
collapsed, and on September 28, 2005 all of Italy lost power. Power outages are
occasionally associated with natural threats (e.g. lightning) but this is not the reason
for mentioning them here. Power grids are purely physical and intensively controlled
systems.
Also, substantial experience exists with power grid overloads.
Nevertheless, massive failures can evidently occur very often because the human
controllers are overwhelmed by non-prioritized alarm messages as was the case in the
Swiss Federal Railroad power outage (Schweizer Eisenbahn Revue, 2005).
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The “Flu”
This is very much on everybody’s mind. Simply recall that the “Spanish Flu” of
1918/19 which appears to have started as an East Asian avian flu and was transmitted
by US troops from Kansas to Europe eventually killed between 20 and 40 million
people. The initial phase was clearly “helped” by the fact that the troops lived in
“close contact” which facilitated transmission. Also rather than warning of the
outbreak, it was initially kept secret for “military” reasons. (The publication in
newspapers in neutral Spain eventually led to the name Spanish Flu; Mörgeli, 2005).
The eventual reaction of governments was a mix of reasonable reaction (prevention of
assembly of people) and helplessness.
Looking at the predicted Asian flu pandemic, one is aware of the potential
countermeasures, ranging from travel restrictions, to wearing face masks to antiviral
drugs and possible vaccination. The question is how to time these measures to be
effective and to prevent panic and major economic (personal to national) losses. It is
also interesting to note that pandemics can be modeled as any other (natural) threat.
As a mater of fact, the small scale person-to-person transmission is very well known.
Larger scale models on influenza pandemics do also exist and actually include the
economic consequences (e.g. Meltzer et al., 1999). Similar to other natural threatsmodels, e.g. for earthquakes, they formally include uncertainties. In contrast to the
other natural threats and thus a major problem is the fact that there is no possibility to
calibrate these models before the pandemic hits.
Summary and Conclusions from Tentative Lessons
The cases described above and knowledge about other events and warning systems
allow one to draw some generally valid conclusions:
•

Warning systems require a time interval between the recognition of the threat
and the time of impact. Hence, for earthquakes, at least with the present
knowledge, warning is not possible. However, if knowledge exists on general
conditions that may lead to a sudden event, warning is possible. Examples are
rainfall induced landslides or flooding, and Tsunamis following earthquakes.

•

Very often there is a sequence of natural threats (earthquake or seaslide
leading to Tsunamis -, rainfall followed by erosion leading to a landslide) or a
threat followed by an infrastructure/organization failure leading to a second
threat (Katrina levee breaks, Rita evacuation panic).

•

Clearly, physical warning devices which record the threat when it occurs
(seismographs, DART (Deep Ocean Assessment and Reporting TsunamiBuoys), rainfall measurement devices, etc.) as well as satellite and airplane
based observations are of central importance. Equally important are the
communication systems, transmitting this information from the physical
warning devices to control centers where these observations are interpreted,
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usually making use of models, (see below). It is, however, possible that the
threat actually destroys the communication systems.
•

“Secondary” consequences such as debris in floods or contamination appear to
be very important but rarely included in warning systems.

•

An essential part of warning systems are models of the threats. These can be
subdivided into large scale (large region) and small scale (small region, local)
models. The large scale models for major natural threats are reasonably
adequate, possibly with the exception of the final tracking of hurricanes.
Small scale models exist but the cases discussed have shown that many are
missing. It is questionable if they ever will be developed to provide complete
coverage. A prioritization is possible and advisable.
Both regarding large - and small scale models is the necessity to be able to
continuously and immediately update them while the event/threat is occurring.

•

Observations and model results need to be interpreted to make predictions.
Most of these predictions will involve some degree of uncertainty. The
interpretation will then be used by decision makers to issue the warning. As
the cases have shown, this appears to be a weak spot in that decisions are not
taken, decisions cannot be made because of overwhelming or confusing
information, political reluctance or infighting.
Also, human error on any level from the top decision makers to the affected
population needs to be anticipated and planned for in warning systems
(political mess, Katrina; power failure, Switzerland).

•

Evacuation is the primary means for saving lives. Evacuation requires well
developed plans which are effectively communicated to the population.
Education/rehearsal is an essential aspect producing “gut” reactions such as
taking cover under benches/door frames in earthquakes, and adhering to
evacuation plans.
Protection of property, particularly for the poor population is an essential basis
for effective evacuation and thus saving lives. This has to start well before the
threat materializes by building confidence in the population that such
protection will be provided.
Warning systems/processes leading to evacuation have to include the
possibility to call off the warning and do so effectively. In other words, the
reversal of a warning and its consequence has to be as well planned as the
issuing of a warning.
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Warnings systems have to avoid panic. This is particularly difficult if the
population is sensitized by an event that occurred a short time before. (Rita).
•

Warnings and countermeasures (evacuation, etc.) appear to work much better
if organized and implemented on a small scale with upper level entities
functioning in a subsidiary manner (flood Switzerland, industrial plants and
small cities in Rita).

•

Physical infrastructure can be built to resist or at least survive the threat. This
plays an essential role in warning systems.

Much of the preceding indicates that warning systems have to be very flexible
and adaptable to the evolving conditions.
Examples of Established Warning Systems
As mentioned above, warning systems consist of devices capturing relevant signals,
models for relating the signal to potential threats, people and procedures interpreting
the modeled results, evaluating consequences and issuing warnings. Such warnings
have then to be communicated to potentially affected areas and lead to passive or
active countermeasures. Two examples are described below: the Puerto Rico
Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System and the Swiss Avalanche Warning System,
and are then compared to the comments in the preceding section.
The PRTWMP
The Puerto Rico Tsunami Warning and Mitigation Procedure (PRTWMP) has been
described by Von Hillebrandt-Andrade and Moreno (2004). The tsunamis in this
procedure are assumed to have an earthquake as their source. Local tsunamis (up to
24 minutes travel time triggered by an earthquake in the PRVI (Puerto Rico-Virgin
Islands) region), regional tsunamis (24 minutes to 2 hours travel time) and distant
tsunamis (greater than 2 hours travel time) are distinguished. Based on detection of
an earthquake by a monitoring station of the Puerto Rico Seismic Network (PRSN)
and an evaluation of this information, the PRSN will issue one of 4 messages:
1.

Felt Earthquake (Earthquake Magnitude < 6 if local, <7.5 if small distance, <8
if greater distance; focal depth >60 km; earthquake under land; intensity < VII)
No follow-up measures
2.

Tsunami Warning (Earthquake Magnitude > 6.5 in the PRVI region and focal
depth < 60 km; magnitude > 7.5 beyond PRVI but with travel time < 2 hrs;
intensity > VII in Puerto Rico; reliable reports of observed tsunamis locally and
in Eastern Caribbean).
Evacuate all low-lying areas since tsunami possible with 2 hours
11

3.

Tsunami Watch (Earthquake Magnitude > 8.0 and shallower than 60 km in
Caribbean west of 80°W, in the Gulf of Mexico, and in the Atlantic Ocean
beyond 35° and 75° W and 10° and 35°N; reliable reports on observed tsunami
with possibility of reaching the Caribbean).
Prepare for possible evacuation
4.

All clear (PRSN determines that conditions to issue a tsunami warning or watch
are not met; or, if conditions are met, that there is no report on observed
tsunamis; behavior of sea returned to normal)

The Swiss Avalanche Warning System
The following has been summarized from Bründl et al., 2004 and the WSL/SLF
website.
The Swiss (Federal) Institute of Snow and Avalanche Research in Davos
(Schweizerisches Institut für Schnee- und Lawinen Forschung - SLF) issues a regular
avalanche bulletin at 5 p.m. each day during the avalanche season. This bulletin is
updated at 8 a.m. the following day. The bulletin provides national and regional
assessment of avalanche threats on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest). These
bulletins are available via a special telephone number and are also available on the
radio in form of live interviews daily, shortly before 5 p.m. The bulletins are
developed by SLF based on
•
•
•
•
•

Meteorological forecasts
Automated wind (average and max wind speed within 30 minute intervals)
and snow (height, fresh snow height, snow surface - and air temperature)
stations
Local observers (ca 80) reporting on snow and weather conditions
Reports on actual avalanche occurrences
The "SNOPACK" model

While the bulletin is adequate for general warnings, it needs to be
supplemented/enhanced for use by the personnel responsible for safety. Depending
on the locality, the safety responsibility is with the political community, or with
transportation systems transporting tourists into ski areas, or with the
cantonal/regional road administration. The safety specialists undergo a special
education at the SLF and have direct electronic access to the avalanche bulletin as
well directly to the relevant measurement stations. The safety specialists are then
responsible for closure of the ski areas, roads, and in the extreme, evacuation of
houses (see Bründl et al., 2004, for details). An interesting aspect of this so called
IFKIS (see also IFKIS Information Manager, 2004) is that it not only includes
information flowing from the SLF to the safety specialists but also between the safety
specialists.
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Comments
The two warning systems have the required characteristics
An initial threat/event (earthquake) or general conditions (snow, wind) is
recorded by technical devices and starts the process
Models and experience are used to make first interpretations
Further observations involve a combination of human and technical
observations and are used to update the information.
In the avalanche case the updating then transfers to the local/regional safety
specialists
Warnings are often gradual, involving an initial warning in preparation for the
next step or a call-off
Regional/local entities issue the warning and the related countermeasures
(evacuation, road closure) or call off the warning
What the recent events and the Warning Systems above show is that it is necessary to
evaluate risk management, in general, and warning systems, in particular. Such an
evaluation should allow one to compare different systems and their components in
order to choose the most effective approach. This will be attempted in the following.
Formal Risk Assessment Procedure
As the first author has shown at a number of occasions (e.g. Einstein, 1997), it is
possible to use the structure of decision making under uncertainty (Figure 14a) to
formalize the risk assessment process for natural threats (Figure 14b). Potential
threats (also called “danger” or “event”) are combined with a probability to express a
hazard. This in turn is combined with consequences to express risk (Risk = Hazard ×
Worth of Loss). Formally, risk can thus be described as:
R = P[T] × u ( C )

(1)

Where
R
= Risk
P[T] = Probability of Threat = Hazard
u( C ) = Utility of the consequences, where
C is a vector of attributes if one uses a multiattribute approach
(Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Baecher, 1981)
Usually one tries to also express the fact that the consequences are uncertain. This is
often called vulnerability and expressed by the conditional probability P[C|T] and
thus risk:
R = P[T] × P[C|T] × u ( C )

(2)
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Risk Management, of which warning systems are a part, changes any one or all of the
components of Eq. 2 such that a reduced risk R’ results. (This has been discussed
earlier by Einstein, 1997, but is quickly summarized here.)
Active countermeasures reduce P[T] to P'[T] where P'[T] < P[T], e.g. tiebacks
preventing a slope failure.
Passive countermeasures reduce the vulnerability P[C|T] to P’[C|T] where P'[C|T] <
P[C|T] or reduce the consequences from u( C ) to u( C ') where u( C ) < u( C '), or both.
Examples from the slope stability domain are:
•
•

A protective shed reduces the probability of rocks falling on a road –
vulnerability reduction
A traffic signal triggered by falling rock reduces the speed of cars and thus the
damage to a car hitting a rock lying on the road, i.e., it reduces the
consequences. (As a matter of fact, the traffic signal may also reduce the
vulnerability i.e. the probability that a car hits a rock in the first place.)

Active or passive countermeasures are associated with a cost and thus the expression
for reduced risk will be for an active countermeasure:
R’ = P’[T] × P[C|T] × u ( C ) + u(CA)

(3)

Where u (CA) is the utility or in simpler terms the cost of active countermeasures.
Similar expressions can be formulated for passive countermeasures or combinations
of active and passive countermeasures.
It may be desirable to also include the fact that countermeasures may not be 100%
effective. This is done best with Bayesian updating, e.g. for active countermeasures.

[Tj | CE] =
PÕ
[Tj ] = PÕ

P[Tj ] P[CE | Tj ]

(4)

n

∑P[CE | T ] P[T ]
j

j

j=1

where
P’[Tj] and P[Tj] as above
P[CE|Tj] = Probability that countermeasures will be effective
Expression in denominator = Normalizing function
In the decision cycles of Figure 14 a/b, such countermeasures can be represented by
the updating cycles as shown in Figure 15.
Eventually one will compare the original Risk R with the modified risk R’ and
decide on implementing the countermeasures if R’ < R. This is a somewhat
simplistic approach and more subtle usages of decision analysis have been discussed
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by Keeney and Raiffa (1976), and Baecher (1981), as well as by the first author,
Einstein (1997).
It has been mentioned previously that warning systems are a part of risk
management. In other words, they are a part of the countermeasures. Usually they
will be passive countermeasures reducing P[C|T] to P’[C|T] or changing u( C ) to
u( C ') or both. For instance, warnings leading to evacuation are vulnerability
reductions while the previously mentioned example of a traffic light in a rockfall area
may affect the consequence directly [u( C')]. This consideration of warning systems
is sufficient as an introduction in the context of the decision making process for risk
assessment and management regarding natural threats. The discussion of recent
events and existing warning systems has, however, shown that warning systems are
more complex and they will now be treated in more detail but still in the context of
decision making under uncertainty.
Formal Procedures for Warning Systems in Risk Management Systems
Basics

In the context of the formal risk assessment/management graphs of the preceding
section (Figures 14 and 15), warning systems are characterized by:
1.

They are part of risk management, i.e. they trigger the passive (mostly) and
active (occasionally) countermeasures through additional information in the
updating cycles.

2.

Updating cycles may not be entirely effective, i.e. they are associated with
uncertainties.

Warning devices/systems trigger the countermeasures, and the triggering effect can
be shown by adding to the diagram of Figure 15 as shown in Figure 16.
The effectiveness of warning systems can be expressed by conditional probabilities.
P[W|T]
P[NW|T]
P[W|NT]
P[NW|NT]

=
=
=
=

Warning issued if threat exists
No warning issued, if threat exists
Warning issued, if no threat exists
No warning issued, if no threat exists.

These expressions can be combined with the updating/modifications of the threat
probabilities P[T] → P’[T] or vulnerabilities P[C|T] → P’[C|T] and the associated
utilities (costs) of the passive and active countermeasures as well as the utility (cost)
of the warning system itself, to obtain the modified risk with warning systems. The
expression below shows this for an updating of vulnerabilities with warning systems.
R’ = u[W] + [P[T] × P[W|T] × P’[C|T] × [u( C) + u(CP)]]
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(5)

+ [P[T] × P [NW|T] × P[C|T] × u( C )]
+ [P[1-T] × P[W|NT] × u(CP)]
where:
P[T] = Probability of Threat = Hazard
P[C|T], P’[C|T] original and updated vulnerabilities, the latter includes the
effectiveness of countermeasures as discussed earlier.
u( C) = utility (cost) of consequence
u(CP) = utility (cost) of passive countermeasures
u(W) = utility (cost) of warning system
Similar expressions can be formulated for active countermeasures and combinations
of active and passive countermeasures. A good way to represent these interactions is
with decision trees and with Bayesian chains, which will be discussed below.
Risk Calculations

The expressions discussed above can be conveniently structured in tree format.
Figure 17 shows a tree where:
-

the warning device (system) is in place
it issues an alarm/or not
if the alarm is correct, countermeasures are taken/or not
the threat materializes/or not
the countermeasure is effective/or not
different damage levels occur

Note that most of the nodes of the tree are so called chance nodes combining the
results of the branches to the right. However, the node "take measure or not" is a
decision node. The tree here represents well what was discussed previously, namely,
a warning system included in a risk management system. The assumed utilities
(costs) represent the consequences/damages but also penalties (in parentheses) for
having taken a wrong decision or having a non-functioning warning device. The
probabilities on the right most branches are also assumed and then propagated to the
left with a total probability theorem. Each node shows the corresponding
probabilities and expected values.
Such trees can be easily formulated with spread sheets, which in turn allow
one to run sensitivity analyses.
Figures 18a to c show simple examples using the numbers in the tree of Figure
17. They demonstrate the effect of the cost of the countermeasures, the effectiveness
of the countermeasures and the probability of the threat on the expected cost. All
these cases show a cross-over for taking measures and not taking measures indicating
when one or the other should be used.
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Another brief example involves the fundamental decision of using a warning
device, or taking active countermeasures or passive countermeasures or taking no
action (Figure 19a). Each of these major branches can then be formulated as a subtree such as that for the warning device in Figure 17. Figure 19c shows the sub-tree
"active countermeasure" with the significantly reduced probability of a threat. Again
sensitivity analyses can be performed such as the one shown in Figure 20 where all
actions are compared as the probability of the threat changes, including also different
effectiveness of the warning device (100%, 90%, 50%).
As can be easily imagined, formulating the entire problem, which is actually
much more complex than what is shown in Figure 19a, will lead to very complex
trees. It is in such cases much better to resort to so called Bayesian Networks
(Bayesian Chains).
Bayesian Networks

A Bayesian network is a representation of knowledge for reasoning under uncertainty.
It is a concise representation of the joint probability of the domain that is being
represented by the random variables.
Bayesian networks can be used at any stage of a risk analysis, and may
substitute both fault trees and event trees in logical tree analysis. While common
cause or more general dependency phenomena pose significant complications in
classical fault tree analysis, this is not the case with Bayesian networks. They are in
fact designed to facilitate the modeling of such dependencies. Because of what has
been stated, Bayesian networks provide a good tool for decision analysis, including
prior analysis, posterior analysis and pre-posterior analysis. Furthermore, they can be
extended to influence diagrams, including decision and utility nodes in order to
explicitly model a decision problem.
Bayesian networks and decision trees show different type of information. The
Bayesian networks (influence diagrams) show the dependencies between variables
more clearly than the decision trees. The decisions trees show in more detail all the
possible scenarios and different paths, but for that reason they can become extremely
large. The Bayesian networks are a much more compact representation of the
problem.
Figure 21 shows a simple Bayesian Network applied to warning device.
Essentially the damage will depend on whether or not the threat happens. The device
issuing an alarm will depend also on the threat (reliability matrix). The decision of
taking a measure will depend on the warning device issuing an alarm. Finally the
utilities depend on the level of damage and on whether or not an action was taken and
whether or not this action was effective.
Associated with utility nodes are utility functions that enable one to compute
the expected utility of a decision. Table 1 shows an example of a utility node function
for the warning device. Table 2 shows the conditional probability table for the
warning device node, which represents the reliability matrix for the warning device.
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Summary and Conclusions
Summary

The review of existing warning systems and of major events allows one to define
what a warning system should consist of and where they failed. In the following, the
six essential elements (bold) of warning systems, possible problems with these
elements and ways to eliminate these problems (cursive) are listed.
1.

The threat/event or general conditions likely to produce a threat are
recorded by technical devices.

Technical devices may not exist, be destroyed or communication may be
interrupted by the threat.
Install technical device and provide redundancies.
Several threats may occur in sequence (one initiates the next) and the
technical devices etc. may not be equipped for this or get destroyed in the first
threat.
Install technical device and provide redundancies.
2.

The information is transferred to "centers" where it is interpreted based
on predictive models and experience.

Large scale models are usually quite adequate but may need some
improvement; small scale models are often missing or are inadequate.
Further model development
Calibration of models
Humans are overwhelmed by information and/or make errors
The information transfer system needs to weed out non-essential information
Several independent redundant models
Experience
Decisions are affected by the potential consequences of over/under-reacting
Have a system/process which allows one to update decisions
3.

Depending on the interpretation, an initial warning is issued and
transmitted to the potentially affected areas.

No clear assignment of responsibilities, no experience.
Plan and rehearse
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4.

Further observations involving a combination of human and technical
observations are used to update the information and the predictions.

Often not done, hampered by technical inadequacies, lacking models,
overwhelmed people.
Remedies as in Elements 1 and 2 above.
5.

The warning is updated, i.e. the warning level is increased or it is called
off. Transmission to the affected areas is as in Element 3 above.

Like 3 and: Warnings rarely include warning of secondary consequences
Requires separate and different set of technical devices, models and
interpretations.
6.

Local or regional entities decide after elements 3 and 5 on the
countermeasures and initiate the countermeasures. (At this point,
transition from warning to countermeasures takes place and based on the
discussed events, this is where most of the problems occurred.)

In evacuations, anything from the wrong timing to unwillingness to evacuate,
to non-availability of transportation, including clogged roads, to false reaction
including unnecessary panic can happen.
Well developed plans, property protection, intense education and rehearsals
all based on a solid organization in which the affected population has
confidence.
Since many unanticipated problems may occur, the evacuation and other
countermeasures have to be flexible (with updating!)
Evacuation and other countermeasures are best if based on individual/local
action with subsidiary higher level support
Physical active and passive countermeasures (floodgates, elevated buildings,
etc.) are often necessary, but do not exist.
Build
Conclusions

This paper cannot provide a complete listing of warning systems; it cannot either list
all things that can go wrong and how this can be prevented. What it does, however,
based on the formal decision making process is to describe and demonstrate, with
simple examples, tools with which warning systems and risk management systems
can be evaluated. This should make it possible to prioritize what needs to be
developed - in simple terms components that have the greatest effect on reducing the
uncertainties and reducing the cost should be considered first. The other message is
that risk management and warning systems have to be flexible and updatable both
during an event/threat and as experience and technical capabilities increase.
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Figure 1. The "Genoa Low" on 22.08.05
(from BWG 2005

Station

Rainfall

Engelberg
Einsiedeln
Meiringen
Marbach/LU
Napf

190 mm
152 mm
205 mm
181 mm
178 mm

Max Historic
Value
153 mm
142 mm
159 mm
165 mm
158 mm

Recorded on
21.12 1991
07.08.1978
07.03.1896
02.06.2004
13.02.1990

Measurements
Since
1901
1900
1889
1961
1978

Figure 2. 48 Hour Rainfall in 2005 Alpine Flood compared to Preceding
Measurements (from BWG 2005)

Figure 3. Flooding in Switzerland on August 23
NZZ August 30, 2005
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Figure 4. Effect of Summer 2005 Flood on NS Transportation Axes. From East to
West: Bernadino Highway Axis - closed. Gotthard Railroad and Highway
Axis - closed. Lötschberg Railroad Axis - closed. Lasanne Simplon
Railroad and Highway Axis - open.

Figure 5. Emergency Preparation of Old Embankment along the Linth Canal
NZZ August 30, 2005
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Figure 6a. Hurricane Katrina Forecast

Figure 6. Hurricane Katrina Actual Path (Level 3 over Florida, increases to Level 5
over Gulf, landfall Mississippi Coast at Level 3)
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Figure 7. Drainage Canals New Orleans
Breaks Occurred along 17th Street Canal, London Avenue Canal and Inner
Harbor Navigation Canal
Also overtopping occurred at the Michaud Levee "Lock" on right side of
photo.
From ENR January 30, 2006

Figure 8. Flood Map New Orleans, September 9,2005.
NPR Q+ A Draining New Orleans - September 9 Update
Map - US Army Corps of Engineers
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a. Large Scale

b. Detail in Baton Rouge
Figure 9. Evacuation Plan, New Orleans
(from Wolshon, 2006)
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Figure 10. Traffic Flow New Orleans Evacuation
(from Wolshon, 2006)
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Figure 11a. Rita Forecast

Figure 11b.

Rita Actual Track
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Figure 12. Galveston - Houston (Harris County)
Evacuation Plan
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Figure 13. Evacuation from Rita, September 23, 2005
Blick, September 24, 2005
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Collect
Information
Deterministic
(Model) Phase
Probabilistic
(Model) Phase
Information
(Model) Phase

Updating

Decision
Figure 14a.

The Decision Analysis Cycle

State of Nature
Identify and Describe
Threat

Possible Multi-Step
Probability Determination
Prior Probabilities

Determine Probabilities
and combine with
Threat
Hazard

Indicators and
Likelihood Functions
Posterior Probabilities

Risk Determination

Consequences

Figure 14b. Decision Analysis Cycle Applied to Natural Threats - Risk Assessment and
Management
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State of Nature
Possible Multi-Step
Probability Determination

Identify and Describe
Threat

Prior Probabilities
Indicators and
Likelihood Functions

Determine Probabilities
and combine with
Threat
Hazard

U

Posterior Probabilities

U
Risk Determination

Consequences

Actions, Management
(Zoning, Countermeasures,
Warning,
Additional Exploration)

Figure 15.

U
U

U
U

The Risk Decision Cycle for Natural Threats with Updating
(U = Updating)

State of Nature
Identify and Describe
Threat

Trigger

Determine Probabilities
and combine with
Threat
Hazard

Active
Countermeasures

Risk Determination

Trigger
Passive
Countermeasures

Consequences
Figure 16.

The Risk Decision Cycle for Natural Threats with Warning System:
"Trigger"
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Utilities

Measure is effective

0.20

-5000 + (-1500) = -6500

Damage level 2

0.40

-2500 + (-1500) = -4000

No damage

0.40

0 + (-1500) = -1500

Damage level 1

0.50

-10000 + (-1500) = -11500

0.40

-5000 + (-1500) = -6500

0.10

0+ (-1500) = -1500

0.80
-3500

Threat happens

Damage level 1

0.614
-4500

Damage level 2
Measure is not effective

0.20
-8500

No damage

Take measure
-3727.3

Threat does not happen

0.386

No damage

1.00

0 + (-1000) + (-1500) = -2500

Damage level 1

0.50

-10000

Damage level 2

0.40

-5000

No damage

0.10

0

No damage

1.00

0

-2500

Issues alarm

0.22
-3727.3

Threat happens

0.614
-7000

Do not take measure
-4295.5

Threat does not happen

0.386
0

Warning device
-943

Threat happens

0.50

-10000 + (-1200) = -11200

Damage level 2

0.40

-5000 + (-1200) = -6200

No damage

0.10

0 + (-1200) = -1200

No damage

1.00

0

0.019
-8200

Does not issue alarm

Damage level 1

0.78
-167.7

Threat does not happen

0.981
0

Figure 17.

Warning System - Decision Tree
= Chance Node
= Decision Node
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Max (expected value)

0
-1000
-2000
-3000
-4000
-5000
-6000
-7000
-8000

1 : Take measure
2 : Do not take measure

-9000
-10000
-11000
-9000

-7000

-5000

-3000

-1000

Cost of m easure

Figure 18a. Warning System Sensitivity Analysis - Cost of Measure

-3000

Max (expected value)

-3500
-4000
-4500
1: Take measure

-5000

2 : Do no t take measure

-5500
-6000
-6500
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

P (m easure is effective)

Figure 18b. Warning System Sensitivity Analysis - Effectiveness of Measure

0

Max (expected value)

-1000
-2000
-3000

1: Take measure
2 : Do no t take measure

-4000
-5000
-6000
-7000
0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

0.35

0.4

0.45

P (threat)

Figure 18c. Warning System Sensitivity Analysis - Probability of Threat
34

warning device
Active countermeasures
Decision
Passive countermeasures
No action

Figure 19a. Basic Decision - No Action, Passive or Active Countermeasures, Warning
Device
Utilities
Damage level 1
Threat happens

0.5

-10000

0.4

-5000

0.1

0

1.0

0

15.0%
-7000

Damage level 2
No damage

No action
-1050

threat does not happen

85.0%

No damage

0

Figure 19b. Subtree "No Action" of Decision Tree in Figure 19a.

Utilities
0.5
Threat happens

-10000 + (-1000) = -11000

Damage level 1
0.001
-8000
0.4

-5000+ (-1000)=-6000

Damage level 2
0.1

0+ (-1000) = -1000

No Damage

Active countermeasures
-1007
Threat does not happen

0.999

1.0

-1000

No Damage

0+ (-1000) = -1000

Decision
-1007

Figure 19c. Subtree Active Countermeasures of Decision Tree in Figure 19a.
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Expected value of alternatives vs. P( threat )
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Figure 20.

Warning System Sensitivity Analysis - Cost of Measure
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0.6

Figure 21. Bayesian Network for warning device

Table 1 – Utility Node function

Table 2 – Warning Device
chance node function
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